Aristotle defines three types of pseudos -- the thing that is false (e.g., fool's gold); the thing that is spoken about falsely, and the person who is false. The critical point is that the first two allow us to see the possibility of the third. Otherwise, we would just have to assume that the person whom we encounter is playing certain games of language and action in a grand bid to prevail in life, and we needed merely to enter the game. On the contrary, it is possible for someone to go against their basic social role in a way that makes him or her so difficult to understand, that we continue to think about them according to their formal role, but know this cognition based in appearances to be false (1); and it is possible for people habitually to use language in a way that doesn't allow the alethic elements of speech to do their work (2).
Western society, particularly in its pragmatic, commercial aspects, has chosen to disbelieve in the possibility of this third risk, figuring that the effective people would merely rise. And, in fact, the industrial forms have been thriving. But systematically disbelieving in the possibility of personal falsity in the interests of game-playing seems a risk, and again, perhaps historically a bit unique.
If the industrial forms continue to flourish, and the trucks of frozen hamburgers continue to roll in every few days, the only indication that things might be a bit wrong is the slow discovery of the nature of the people around you, and the events within the apparent world, as they unfold.
So, perhaps, gently down the stream. With care to the surroundings.
#cloudyday