There is a great Man living in this country — a composer.
He has solved the problem how to preserve one's self and to learn.
He responds to negligence by contempt.
He is not forced to accept praise or blame.
His name is Ives.
(Schoenberg)
John
Dewey's system of formal logic is one of the more peculiar animals in
the philosophical menagerie. Less a description of the thoughts that it
might be possible to have about a given thing, it is more a guide for
the perplexed -- in order to help them be more efficiently perplexed --
sort of talking them through the process of thinking about something.
(With the implicit contention that this is what the other fellows were
doing as well, at root.) Santayana's response was quite simple: Is a
naturalistic metaphysics a contradiction in terms?
Music, like
metaphysics, is associated with a tradition that runs from grand style
to primitive (or perhaps primordial) and austere. Like mathematics, its
basic building blocks are sometimes regarded as divine, or at least
ideal. And the result is inevitably made subject to social scrutiny and
deontic force.
Discarding the received seriousness of the art can
come across as flippant, or popularizing, but (especially at the
beginning of the last century and shortly before) it can also be an
attempt to cut to the quick of the question, to avoid being caught up in
the senseless repetition of the past. Grandchildren of Emerson and his
ilk, those New Englanders who took the idealism from German idealism
and used it to free themselves from the iron nominalist fears and laws
of British philosophy and American religion, these puritans (in the best
sense of the word -- cf., again Santayana) strode fearlessly into the
performance halls and lecture theatres of the old forms, and attempted
to make things not practical, but pragmatic. (The distinction, as C.S.
Peirce said, is that the first is essentially meaningless to deeper
inquiry, and the second serves some existing human purpose. Henry James
essentially said that it helped to translate the question into more
immediate terms.) The emphasis was on the actual.
So now, after
many many years, we have these works in the artistic repertory and these
books on the shelves that seem almost childlike in their simplicity,
bookended on either side by artists and thinkers who returned to the
older forms as a more true choice, together with the iconoclasts who
were breaking everything in sight both before and afterwards.
Eavesdropping
on this week's concerts at the NY Phil via the lobby Jumbotron, after a
day of studying James and Peirce, I encounter Ives. (Whom I also
encountered several years ago at the outdoor festival on the plaza
outside, with marching bands criss-crossing the complex, but that was a
long time ago -- even the stone in the plaza was different, almost all
travertine marble, since replaced by patterned asphalt.
The
piece was the second set of orchestral pieces, closing with a
sound-painting of an NYC El station on the day that the news came in
that the Lusitania, sailing out of New York, had been sunk off the coast
of Ireland. The gentle cacophony of the first movement had the whiff
of iconoclasm to it, but in a pragmatic sense, this seeming chaos was in
service of an existing human purpose, and notion of beauty. As
Schoenberg said to Adorno, when being told that his twelve-tone system
was quite popular in some classical music circles: "Yes, but do they use
it to compose with?" Just as Dewey was attempting to serve the
purposes of formal logic itself with his naturalistic metaphysics, the
attempt to compose in freedom is distinct from the effort to bring
freedom to composition. The moment of the spontaneous hymn at the end
was an austere tension, made all the more heartfelt for having observed
none of the usual proprieties. Just around the corner, at the fire
station behind the theatre, there was a similar moment after 9/11, when
the crowd at a scripted vigil (perhaps at the prompting of the present
writer) broke into an unscripted verse or two of "Amazing Grace". While
the Phil responded admirably to those events -- I remember watching
from the back of the balcony as Masur strode onto the stage and to the
podium and struck up the National Anthem. And then there was the
Transmigration, of course.
Classical music venues and ensembles
seem to feel an obligation to present a canon composed of all times, not
allowing the art of any one time to inflect the common project too
substantially. And so, arrayed on the shelf, the notion in these late
19th c. and early 20th c. works that it might be possible to escape from
the past seems confounded, and the (perhaps more critical) desire to
escape from the future is defeated before it even arose. But each work
still makes a proposition on the evenings on which it is performed.
Each book still makes a proposition in the hours in which you are alone
with it. This evening belongs to that hope. And some hopes are
stronger than others. The work fills the evening, even still.
And
now, into Rautavaara's First Piano Concerto, with a soloist striding
brashly onto the stage in the thinnest and shortest of 'flapper'
dresses. One of the listeners in the lobby, perhaps from the adjoining
housing projects, utters a loud cry and rushes off to the WC.
The
composer: "I was disappointed at that time with the strict academic
structuring of serialist music and the ascetic mainstream style of piano
music, which I found anaemic. In the concerto, therefore, I returned to
the aesthetics of expressiveness and a sonorous, “grand-style” keyboard
technique."
The tradition indicates that a modern, or
postmodern work should take a certain style in order to accomplish its
purposes, but something in the composer rises up against that
historically informed form, feeling that it doesn't do the work of
composition. Perhaps we can think of the work of composition as being a
habit of the composer, originating in his or her conceptual purposes,
but becoming a way of living life, of having his or her existence, a way
of knowing what it is to be themselves when they are most themselves.
This, then is what gives the rule to the experimentation with styles,
and distinguishes practical work from pragmatic work.
This habit
of work, then, whether in composing philosophy or writing music, imparts
a certain naturalism to the work. It's the sort of thing a reasonable
person might write or compose. And this is what provoked Santayana's
reaction to Dewey's informal formal logic, querying the notion of a
naturalistic metaphysics, with the implication that metaphysics is not
merely characterized by its historic forms, but constituted by them.
And the same might be said for music. Perhaps the important thing is
not that the work seems naturalistic, but that the one who made it was
so present and alive to the possibility of the work that the work
retained so many traces of his will.
Some analytic philosophers
distinguish object naturalism from subject naturalism; one of these
schools thinks the things in the world to be the sort of things one
finds in nature, and the other (subject naturalism) says that we're
looking at the things in the world in the manner that a human being in
our position might be thought to. Similarly, there is in some aesthetic
criticism, the notion of process naturalism, which, assuming I have the
concept, is the subject naturalism of the creator of a work of art.
But
all of these labels are applied to existing works, written or
performed, in the repertory, characterizing the form of the work. And
this, perhaps is what a healthy Deweyan naturalism should cause us to
query. The work's first existence is music, or philosophy, or what you
will. And, when things are going well, we're not exactly sure what any
of these things might be, and when things are going very well, the
present object of our attention seems to trace out a fullness that
teaches us what music, or philosophy, or the other things are. As
opposed to being constituted by their historic forms.
And now,
the conductor, a composer of some note, launches the ensemble into one
of his own works, a prophecy composed for the NY Phil on the occasion of
the turn of the millennium. In short order (it's a short piece), we're
in a cacophony worthy of Ives, but just like the joyful noises earlier
in the evening, this is in the service of a vision of the time, and
therefore pragmatic, not practical, and actually a more conservative
view of composition than found with the iconoclasts, since we say that
there are purposes to music and ways of carrying these intentions out in
the music.
Which is not to say that the Ives and this work are
working from the same playbook. This piece isn't about overheard music,
but a heartfelt, entirely ingenuous warning about the inherent dangers
of time, perhaps. We are less distant from the object than we are with
the Ives, and comfortably in the rich acoustics of the concert hall, not
wandering through the New England forests.
By freeing itself
from the historical forms, music can perhaps contemplate the nature of
the time (or a moment in time twenty-five years ago), and then stand
affixed in the repertory, between the timelessness of the past gods of
the classical repertory and those to come, the work of a human (so much
so that this seems to be its defining characteristic). Perhaps it is
attempting to accomplish the historic work of the art form without being
bound by its historic forms. It purports to be a living and
intelligent effort; but take it for what you will.